El artículo expone el contexto de la última dictadura militar en la Argentina, y el posterior camino en el juzgamiento de los crímenes de lesa humanidad que tuvieron lugar en ese período. Se describe cómo se utilizaron las leyes amnistías e indulto en el caso argentino, y se analiza la incompatibilidad de estos mecanismos en el juzgamiento de delitos de lesa humanidad, en virtud de los compromisos y obligaciones internacionales de protección de los derechos humanos de suscriptos por los Estados. (...) Además, se estudia el rol de las víctimas y el concepto de reparación, un elemento primordial en este tipo de procesos y en particular en el derecho penal. (shrink)

Behavioral momentum theory has evolved within the realm of operant conditioning. The thought-provoking momentum metaphor equates the strength of an operant response with its resistance to change and preference (i.e., choice) for that response over other available responses. Whereas baseline response rate (velocity in the metaphor) is assumed to be largely influenced by the response-reinforcer contingency, resistance to change and preference are assumed to reflect an intervening variable called behavioral mass, which is determined primarily by the stimulus-reinforcer relationship. This invites (...) the question of how well the momentum metaphor applies to the stimulus-reinforcer relationships of traditional Pavlovian paradigms. Presumably, a correspondence exists between behavioral mass and the notion of associative strength in the associative learning literature. Although response rate has little meaning in the trialwise structure of classical (i.e., Pavlovian) conditioning, response probability or magnitude might be regarded metaphorically as velocity. Momentum theory suggests that resistance to change (e.g., extinction) is a better indicator of associative strength than is response probability or magnitude. Therefore, variables that strengthen Pavlovian learning should influence resistance to extinction of conditioned responding in a similar manner. Moreover, it is important to assess momentum theory outside of strictly operant paradigms, particularly because in clinical settings many common disorders (e.g., phobias) and their therapies (e.g., cue exposure) are thought to be classically conditioned. (shrink)

Este trabajo presenta seis ponencias en torno a los problemas que atraviesan distintos sectores de la población en situación de vulnerabilidad social en el goce de sus derechos humanos en el contexto de la pandemia global de COVID-19. Las exposiciones reflexionan sobre los prejuicios y vulnerabilidades que atraviesan las personas adultas mayores; las violencias de género en contextos de aislamiento; las personas en contextos de movilidad excluidas de las medidas de protección; el tratamiento y priorización de las personas con discapacidad (...) en los centros de derivación de COVID-19; la protección de las garantías penales en la administración de justicia durante los juicios de lesa humanidad llevados en forma remota; y el avance de las causas por crímenes de lesa humanidad durante la pandemia. (shrink)

In this paper I defend Kant’s Incorporation Thesis, which holds that we must “incorporate” our incentives into our maxims if we are to act on them. I see this as a thesis about what is necessary for a human being to make the transition from ‘having a desire’ to ‘acting on it’. As such, I consider the widely held view that ‘having a desire’ involves being focused on the world, and not on ourselves or on the desire. I try to (...) show how this view is connected with a denial of any deep distinction between reason and inclination. I then argue for an alternative view of what ‘having a desire’ involves, one according to which it involves being focused both on the world and on ourselves. I show how this view fits naturally with the Kantian distinction between reason and inclination, accounts for independent intuitions about ‘having a desire’, and supports the Incorporation Thesis. I then make some further suggestions about how we might conceive of the object of incorporation. (shrink)

Feeling like doing something is not the same as deciding to do it. When you feel like doing something, you are still free to decide to do it or not. You are having an inclination to do it, but you are not thereby determined to do it. I call this the moment of drama. This book is about what you are faced with, in this moment. How should you relate to the inclinations you “have,” given that you are free to (...) “act on” them or not? To answer this question, we need an account of what sort of thing we are relating to, in this moment. But here we find a genuine philosophical problem. Our inclinations are forms of motivation, with respect to which we are distinctively passive. To be motivated is to be self-moved. But how can we be passive in relation to our own self-movement? Is our relation to our inclinations like that of rider to horse? Or is it like our relation to our own, spontaneous judgments or perceptions? I lay out three constraints on any theory of inclination, and I argue that familiar theories fail to meet them, because they make being inclined to φ‎ too similar or dissimilar to φ‎-ing. I then put forward the “inner animal” view, which holds that when you are merely inclined to act, the instinctive part of yourself is already active, while the rest of you is not. In this moment, your will is “at a crossroads.” You can humanize your inclination, or dehumanize yourself. (shrink)

In this paper I try to undermine complacency with a predominant conception of desire, for the sake of refocusing attention on a philosophical problem. The predominant conception holds that to have a desire is to occupy an evaluative outlook, a perspective from which the agent 'sees' the world in practically salient terms. I argue that it is not clear what this theory is a theory of, because the concept of desire at its center is deeply ambiguous. Understood as a theory (...) of desire in what I call the "placeholder" sense, the evaluative outlook theory is at bottom a theory of action explanation. So construed, its claim is relatively uncontroversial, and falls far short of being a full theory of action explanation. Understood as a theory of desire in what I call the "substantive" sense, it does not even go so far as to acknowledge the central problem such a theory has to answer. That problem is how we can be passive (in a particular sense) with respect to our own motivation. (shrink)

The prospective formalization of the Anthropocene as a chronostratigraphic unit by the International Commission on Stratigraphy has been intensely debated. This paper explores and assesses the stakes of this process from a philosophical perspective. I distinguish two senses of formalization—the descriptive and the evaluative—and argue that: 1) there are descriptive and evaluative formalizations of the Anthropocene beyond the confines of the ICS; 2) incoherencies between Anthropocene proposals and the ICS’s current tenets are not a decisive reason for deferring descriptive formalization; (...) and 3) the prospective evaluative formalization of the Anthropocene by the ICS would be impactful. (shrink)

Se investigan las condiciones que la doctrina de Kant establece para la predicación de la realidad efectiva de objetos empíricos determinados. Se sostiene: a) que para tal predicación no solo es necesario que haya percepción, sino que también se requiere cierta homogeneidad de los datos sensibles y b) que el conocimiento de la existencia de objetos empíricos determinados depende de la aplicación de principios regulativos de la experiencia.

There is a puzzle in the very notion of passive motivation ("passion" or "inclination"). To be motivated is not simply to be moved from the outside. Motivation is in some sense self-movement. But how can an agent be passive with respect to her own motivation? How is passive motivation possible? In this paper I defend the ancient view that inclination stems from a motivational source independent of reason, a motivational source that is both agential and nonrational.

In this paper I develop an analogy between an interpersonal hierarchy and an intrapersonal hierarchy. The analogy is between the authority of adults over children, and the authority of our willing selves over our wanting selves. The analogy allows us to see how each hierarchy is rooted in an asymmetry that is natural and not merely conventional.

The utilitarian conception, which I call “action as production,” holds that action is a way of making use of the world, conceived as a causal mechanism. According to the rational intuitionist conception, which I call “action as assertion,” action is a way of acknowledging the value in the world, conceived as a realm of status. On the Kantian constructivist conception, which I call “action as participation,” action is a way of making the world, qua causal mechanism, come to count as (...) a realm of status. My rather limited aim in this paper is to identify three substantively different answers the question of how action relates an agent to the world, regarded as a context of action. (shrink)

Al definir “suicidio”, la Real Academia Española toma una opción filosófica que se aleja de algunos propósitos y puntos de vista de la salubridad pública, y acentúa su carácter de actividad íntima que realiza un sujeto capaz de acción. Los límites del concepto no son claros; hay un continuo entre el suicidio y encontrar la muerte por causa natural, accidental o conducta de riesgo. Pero el suicidio solo puede ser fruto de un acto soberano, de modo que quien esté privado (...) de voluntad no es un suicida. Esto permite discutir los planteamientos de B. Spinoza e I. Kant, así como algunas posturas de sanidad pública que no ven ese carácter soberano del suicidio. (shrink)

This chapter is about philosophical method. The Kantian method in the theory of agency is often characterized as a “first-person” method. But what does this mean? I motivate this question by showing how Kantians and most non-Kantians routinely fail to communicate when debating each other about the nature of human agency. I trace this failure to a more fundamental difference in philosophical method, one that tends to go unacknowledged. Most non-Kantian theories of agency, including belief/desire theories and their variants, address (...) the question, “What happens when someone acts?” Kant’s theory, I claim, addresses the question, “What am I doing insofar as I am acting?” As long as this difference remains unarticulated and unexplained, Kantian and non-Kantian theorists of agency will continue to talk past one another. (shrink)

A task of any moral theory is to account for both the rigidity and the flexibility of moral rules. Utilitarianism faces the problem of building rigidity into a framework that tends towards objectionable flexibility. Kantianism faces the problem of building flexibility into a framework that tends towards objectionable rigidity. I offer an argument on this front on behalf of Kantians. I show how Kantians can maintain that actions are right and wrong "in themselves," while still maintaining that such actions can (...) be corrupted under certain "nonideal" circumstances. (shrink)

This paper compares Cohen’s Logic of Pure Knowledge and Cassirer’s Substance and Function in order to evaluate how in these works Cohen and Cassirer go beyond the limits established by Kantian philosophy. In his Logic, Cohen seeks to ground in pure thought all the elements which Kant distinguishes in empirical intuition: its matter (sensation) as well as its form (time and space). In this way, Cohen tries to provide an account of knowledge without appealing to any receptivity. In accordance with (...) Cohen’s project of reformulating the Kantian theory of sensibility, Cassirer undertakes in Substance and Function the task of developing an alternative doctrine of pure and empirical manifolds. But whereas Cohen analyzes the laws of pure thought, Cassirer aims to highlight the functional character of concepts in the development of modern mathematics and physics. I will discuss these two different approaches to the problems raised by Kantian philosophy and I will argue that Cassirer went further than Cohen in the project of critical idealism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze Dimitry Gawronsky’s doctrine of actual infinitesimals. I examine the peculiar connection that his critical idealism establishes between transcendental philosophy and mathematics. In particular, I reconstruct the relationship between Gawronsky’s differentials, Cantor’s transfinite numbers, Veronese’s trans-Archimedean numbers and Robinson’s hyperreal numbers. I argue that by means of his doctrine of actual infinitesimals, Gawronsky aims to provide an interpretation of calculus that eliminates any alleged given element in knowledge.

Drawing on parallels in Hutcheson and Hume, I raise two worries about Bratman’s theory of shared agency. First, has Bratman captured the interpersonal character of shared agency? Second, has he captured its practical character? By “its practical character,” I mean the sense in which shared agency is something we can undertake under that description, and not just a condition we might happen to find ourselves in? I argue that Bratman’s theory falls short of answering this second worry. The source of (...) the shortcoming, I argue, is a fundamental methodological commitment that structures his action theory as a whole. This is the commitment to regard the concepts of action and shared action as empirical concepts, rather than as practical concepts. (shrink)

En A Letter Concerning Toleration John Locke argumenta en favor de la tolerancia religiosa afirmando que el Estado no puede mejorar la vida de las personas forzándolas a vivir de acuerdo con creencias que ellas no suscriben. Más recientemente, Ronald Dworkin y Will Kymlicka han desarrollado argumentos similares. En el caso del primero, contra ciertas políticas paternalistas; en el del segundo, en apoyo de la tesis liberal de la neutralidad estatal. Mi propósito en el presente artículo es analizar la plausibilidad (...) de dichos argumentos concebidos como una defensa de la tesis de la neutralidad estatal. Intentaré demostrar que ambas versiones del argumento fracasan. En la sección II, cuestionaré la capacidad de los argumentos para respaldar las conclusiones que aspiran establecer, sin objetar la plausibilidad de las premisas involucradas. En la sección III, desarrollaré tres objeciones contra la concepción del bienestar crítico que constituye el corazón de ambas versiones del argumento. In A Letter Concerning Toleration, John Locke argues in favor of religious toleration positing that the state cannot make a person's life better by forcing that person to live according to beliefs he refuses. More recently, Ronald Dworkin and Will Kymlicka have developed similar arguments. In the first case, against some paternalistic policies; in the second, in support of the liberal ideal of state neutrality. My aim in the present paper is to analyze the plausibility of these arguments conceived as a defense of liberal neutrality. I will prove that both versions of the argument fail. In section II, I will object the argument's capability to support the conclusions it attempts to establish, without raising doubts about the reliability of its premises. In section III, I will submit three objections against the conception of critical well-being that constitutes the core of both versions of the argument. (shrink)

In these brief comments, I explore some ambiguities concerning John Deigh's notion of empathy in relation to morality and justice. First, does Deigh conceive of empathy as a morally neutral capacity that can be used for good or bad purposes or, rather, as a capacity that presupposes a moral orientation? I look to his previous work and find evidence supporting both readings. I suggest that the right way to understand empathy is as a moral notion. Empathy is the product of (...) an activity—the activity of empathizing. This activity in turn presupposes a certain moral orientation: one that involves placing a certain kind of value on others. I then ask whether Deigh equates empathy with the sense of justice. I do not believe he does, but still he does not say much about the relation between them. I suggest that while the two are not the same, and while there can be tension between them, they ultimately stem from the same basic moral orientation, one that at least vaguely resembles the morality of cooperation. (shrink)

During the second half of the nineteenth century, electronegativity has been one of the most relevant chemical concepts to explain the relationships between chemical substances and their possible reactions. Specifically, EN is a property of the substances that allows them to attract external electrons in bonding situations. The problem arises because EN cannot be measured directly. Indeed, the only way to measure it is through different properties that do can be directly measured, for instance enthalpy, ionization energies or electron affinities. (...) What is particularly troubling about this case in quantum chemistry is that the different models used to describe and quantify EN are incompatible but, in a certain sense, equivalent because the same EN scale results in all of them. By analyzing Linus Pauling’s and Robert Mulliken’s models of EN, it will be argued that, if we remain cling to a traditional representative conception of models, we cannot understand the meaning of the information provided by those models. Indeed, if we do not want to adopt an instrumentalist point of view concerning chemical knowledge, we should reconsider by virtue of what a model represents the system, or, in other words, which the factors that determine the representative power of a model are. I will propose a new perspective that incorporates the role of experimental techniques in the very notion of representation; this perspective allows us to understand how supposedly incompatible models of the same target system can be both simultaneously representative. (shrink)

El presente trabajo es parte de una investigación de magíster en la cual se examina el problema de los universales en el período medieval, específicamente en los autores Avicena, Enrique de Gante y Duns Scotus. En él se analiza la comprensión escotista de los universales, así como también su relación con el conocimiento, Dios y el principio de individuación. Scotus dedica el conocimiento abstractivo a los universales, o sea, el conocimiento abstractivo es el tipo de conocimiento que permite a los (...) seres humanos conocer a los universales. Estos, por su parte, son totalmente contingentes, siendo creados o destruidos por Dios con base solamente en la voluntad divina. Además, un universal adquiere una existencia material cuando es concretado por la haecceitas, cuando “está presente” en un individuo existente en acto. Para tal análisis se utilizan partes de textos como Quodlibet q. 13, Ordinatio II, d. 3, Lectura I, d. 39, Reportatio I-A, d. 38. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to show how some elements were applied in a project of empirical investigation of the denominated style of qualitative investigation called grounded theory. This denomination talks about to that the construction of theory is based on the empirical data that sustain i..

The polarisation of the embryonic anteroposterior (AP) axis requires the establishment of positional cues with spatial information, and often involves complex intercellular communications, cell adhesion and cell movement. Recent work on several fronts has begun to shed light on how the initial asymmetries are established and maintained. In this review, I discuss the polarisation of the AP axis during Drosophila oogenesis, focusing on the function of the Notch signalling pathway and its relationship to the activation of the epidermal growth factor (...) receptor. I make special reference to some aspects of Notch activity regulation during oogenesis that appear to depart from the canonical pathway. Finally, I hypothesise on possible similarities between these activities of Notch signalling during Drosophila oogenesis and vertebrate somitogenesis. BioEssays 25:781–791, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

A través del siguiente artículo presento algunas ideas acerca de la forma en que pienso el ejercicio del terapeuta filosófico. En breves apartados planteo la necesidad de entender que la Asesoría Filosófica se debe acercar a los enfoques propuestos por la teoría general de los sistemas, por lo tanto, es preciso que se conciba su quehacer en términos de integridad y de unidad, tanto disciplinar, como en su práctica terapéutica. Para ello, abordaré aspectos generales que ayuden a comprender algunos problemas (...) de la asesoría filosófica o filosofía clínica, y luego haré una reflexión que invita a pensar, que enfoques de la teoría general de los sistemas, pueden favorecer las prácticas terapéuticas dentro de este nuevo-viejo modo de hacer filosofía. Philosophy and Unity. A Reflection on Philosophical Counseling as a systemic work Throughout the following paper I present some ideas about the way I think of the philosophical therapist’s practice. In short sections I pose the need to understand that Philosophical Counseling is to come closer to the approaches proposed by the general theory of systems, and consequently that it is to conceive its work in terms of integrity and unity, both thas discipline and in its therapeutic practice. To this aim, I will address general aspects that help to understand some problems of philosophical counseling or clinical philosophy. After that I will reflect on how approaches from the general theory of systems might favor therapeutic practices within this both new-fashioned and old-fashioned way to do philosophy. (shrink)

Let ${\mathcal {K}}$ be a quasivariety. We say that ${\mathcal {K}}$ is a term quasivariety if there exist an operation of arity zero _e_ and a family of binary terms $\{t_i\}_{i\in I}$ such that for every $A \in {\mathcal {K}}$, $\theta$ a ${\mathcal {K}}$ -congruence of _A_ and $a,b\in A$ the following condition is satisfied: $(a,b)\in \theta$ if and only if $(t_{i}(a,b),e) \in \theta$ for every $i\in I$. In this paper we study term quasivarieties. For every \(A\in (...) {\mathcal {K}}\) and $a,b\in A$ we present a description for the smallest ${\mathcal {K}}$ -congruence containing the pair (_a_, _b_). We apply this result in order to characterize ${\mathcal {K}}$ -compatible functions on _A_ (i.e., functions which preserve all the ${\mathcal {K}}$ -congruences of _A_) and we give two applications of this property: (1) we give necessary conditions on ${\mathcal {K}}$ for which for every $A \in {\mathcal {K}}$ the ${\mathcal {K}}$ -compatible functions on _A_ coincides with a polynomial over finite subsets of _A_; (2) we give a method to build up ${\mathcal {K}}$ -compatible functions. (shrink)

This article tries to establish the scopes and limits of the main interpretations on Newton during the 20th century, highlighting on the one hand the textual evidence at disposal, and on the other hand the philosophical and epistemological currents that defines the main features of those interpretations. It will be shown that the rejection of positivism is not sufficient condition for establishing an adequate interpretation and, together with the strengthening of the research from Newton’s manuscript, it is necessary a wider, (...) and more detailed model that those established by some of the most outstanding scholars like Alexandre Koyré, I. Bernard Cohen, Betty Dobbs, and Richard Westfall. (shrink)

Revisión del libro En la cresta de la ola. Debates y definiciones en torno a la historia del tiempo presente por E. Allier Montaño, C. I. Vilchis Ortega y C. V. Ovalle (coord.).

Se defiende la tesis de que la teoría kantiana del espacio, en el contexto del idealis-mo trascendental, constituye un marco adecuado para solucionar la paradoja de las contrapartidas incongruentes. Se incluyen dos hipótesis: a) la solución kantiana implica una referencia a la conciencia de la propia corporalidad, para comprender cómo poseemos la capacidad para orientarnos en el espacio; b) no existe contradicción en el uso kantiano de las contrapartidas incongruentes en diferentes estadios de su pensamiento. La solución kantiana de 1768 (...) constituye una versión germinal del desarrollo que culminará en la teoría idealista trascendental acerca del espacio como una forma de nuestra sensibilidad. (shrink)

An equivalence between the category of MV-algebras and the category $${{\rm MV^{\bullet}}}$$ MV ∙ is given in Castiglioni et al. :67–92, 2014). An integral residuated lattice with bottom is an MV-algebra if and only if it satisfies the equations $${a = \neg \neg a, \vee = 1}$$ a = ¬ ¬ a, ∨ = 1 and $${a \odot = a \wedge b}$$ a ⊙ = a ∧ b. An object of $${{\rm MV^{\bullet}}}$$ MV ∙ is a residuated lattice which in (...) particular satisfies some equations which correspond to the previous equations. In this paper we extend the equivalence to the category whose objects are pairs, where A is an MV-algebra and I is an ideal of A. (shrink)

This article presents the so-called “ontological argument” from a comparison with the “regula” Anselms establishes in his Monologion, c. 15. This rule would allow, under a certain respect, to consider existence as a perfection attributable to God, even though it does not possess the same ontological status of any other attribute, i.e. cannot be considered a real predicate. Consequently, it is possible to outline the different senses in which Anselm understands the notion of “being” and the conditions under which existence (...) and real perfection can transcend the sphere of creatures and help conceiving God. This distinction of the senses of being would later allow for existence to be considered a perfection, just as real predicates are, but according to a completely different meaning. (shrink)

This article focuses on the first treatise of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, regarding the historical origins of the noble and slave morality, and proposes the intrinsic possession or lack of power as a key notion to understand these origins. Given the significance that Nietzsche ascribed to the Ancient world, the notion of power will be elucidated through a comparison with some selected texts by Heraclitus and Plato. The first part deals with intrinsic power as the primary source of (...) the noble morality, its consequences with regards to the notion of good and the image human beings have of themselves and their place in the world. The second part presents powerlessness as the root of all moral resentment, i.e. of the slave morality, focusing on Plato’s conception of the?????, as well as his definition of being as the power (???????) to perform an action or to be acted upon. The third part synthesizes the previous sections and shows the relation between the noble and slave morality regarding both power and cruelty, i.e. their own account of what good and evil are. Keywords: Greek philosophy, Heraclitus, history of morality, Homer, Friedrich Nietzsche, Plato, Paul Rée. (shrink)

Music the art of combining sounds, maintains a sequence of time with harmony, melody and rhythm, generates changes in cognitive processes, improves concentration, memory, influences mood, produces changes in emotions, helps control anxiety, increases motivation, and decreases cortisol levels, the stress hormone, activates the hormone of happiness and rest, serotonin and melatonin. The objective was to analyze the influence of music in the purchase process and decision. The approach was qualitative-quantitative, exploratory level, descriptive statistics was applied to identify the main (...) trends and musical genres. The survey was carried out online, in the "La Condamine" market (November-December 2022). The sample 354 customers. The results of the investigation determined that customers enjoy listening to instrumental sounds in the food court, and in the vegetable, fruit and vegetable section; and the musical genre pop and/or reggaeton in the clothing section. The survey data was corroborated with the results of the biometric eyes tracking equipment in eight participants, attention, meditation and blinking were analyzed, with two sounds, sound 1: folk music and sound 2: pop; the average of the evaluations determined the level of acceptance of the participants for the musical genre, confirming the traditional survey with the results of the biometric equipment. Hearing goes beyond what can be perceived with sight and smell; there are sounds and melodies that connect us with emotions (laugh, cry, enjoy) and memories. It is concluded, (i) consider the musical genre according to the segment, (ii) the hours of greatest influx of customers, (iii) areas or sections of the market with greater or lesser product sales, (iv) slow music in places with more expensive products to extend their stay in the establishment. (shrink)

Background Q-CEP (Qualificação dos Comitês de Ética em Pesquisa que compõem o Sistema CEP/Conep) is a nationwide project resulting from a partnership between the Brazilian National Research Ethics Commission (Conep), the Ministry of Health and Hospital Moinhos de Vento (HMV). It was developed to consolidate policy for ethical review of research with human beings in all members of the CEP/Conep System, Brazil’s national system of institutional review boards. The aim of this study was therefore to report on the experience and (...) results of the Q-CEP project. Methods An observational, retrospective study includes data from the Q-CEP, obtained from visits to all the institutional research ethics committees (RECs) in the country. The actions implemented by Q-CEP were part of a two-step process: (i) training visits to each REC; (ii) development of distance learning modules on strategic topics pertaining to research ethics evaluation. The data presented herein cover step one (training visits), defined by Q-CEP as the diagnostic stage of the project. For a country with social and economics inequalities such as Brazil, this is a particularly important stage; an accurate picture of reality is needed to inform planning of quality improvement strategies. Results In 2019–2021, Q-CEP visited 832 RECs and trained 11,197 people. This sample covered almost all active RECs in the country; only 4 (0.5%) were not evaluated. Of the 94 items evaluated, 62% did not reach the target of at least 80% compliance and around 1/4 (26%) were below 50% compliance. The diagnostic stage of the process revealed inadequacies on the part of the RECs in their ethical reviews. The analysis of informed consent forms showed compliance in only 131 RECs (15.74%). The description of pending issues made by RECs in their reports was compliant in 19.33% (n = 161). Administrative and operational aspects were also considered inadequate by more than half of the RECs. Conclusions Overall, Brazilian RECs showed poor compliance in several aspects of their operation, both in ethics evaluation and in other processes, which justifies additional training. The Q-CEP project is part of a quality improvement policy promoted by the Brazilian Ministry of Health. The data obtained in the diagnostic step of the project have contributed to the qualification and consolidation of one of the world’s largest research ethics evaluation systems. (shrink)

In this paper we study the variety $\textsf{WL}$ of bounded distributive lattices endowed with an implication, called weak Lewis distributive lattices. This variety corresponds to the algebraic semantics of the $\{\vee,\wedge,\Rightarrow,\bot,\top \}$ -fragment of the arithmetical base preservativity logic $\mathsf {iP^{-}}$. The variety $\textsf{WL}$ properly contains the variety of bounded distributive lattices with strict implication, also known as weak Heyting algebras. We introduce the notion of WL-frame and we prove a representation theorem for WL-lattices by means of WL-frames. We extended (...) this representation to a topological duality by means of Priestley spaces endowed with a special neighbourhood relation between points and closed upsets of the space. These results are applied in order to give a representation and a topological duality for the variety of weak Heyting–Lewis algebras, i.e., for the algebraic semantics of the arithmetical base preservativity logic $\textsf{iP}^{-}$. (shrink)

In this paper we shall prove that certain subvarieties of the variety of Salgebras (Heyting algebras with successor) has amalgamation. This result together with an appropriate version of Theorem 1 of [L. L. Maksimova, Craig’s theorem in superintuitionistic logics and amalgamable varieties of pseudo-boolean algebras, Algebra i Logika, 16(6):643-681, 1977] allows us to show interpolation in the calculus IPC S (n), associated with these varieties.We use that every algebra in any of the varieties of S-algebras studied in this work has (...) a canonical extension, to show completeness of the calculus IPC S (n) with respect to appropriate Kripke models. (shrink)

This essay revisits Meyer Schapiro’s critique of Heidegger’s interpretation of Van Gogh’s painting of a pair of shoes in order to raise the question of the dispute between art history and philosophy as a contest increasingly ceded to the claim of the expert and the hegemony of the museum as culture and as cult or coded signifier. Following a discussion of museum culture, I offer a hermeneutic and phenomenological reading of Heidegger’s ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ and conclude (...) by taking Heidegger’s discussion of the strife between earth and world to the site of the ancient temple of Apollo Epicurius at Bassae as an example of the insistent foreclosure of the ancient work of art and the conflicts of the pervasive efforts of modern conservation. (shrink)

It is widely assumed that Kant’s moral psychology draws from the dualist tradition of Plato and Aristotle, which takes there to be distinct rational and non-rational parts of the soul. My aim is to challenge the air of obviousness that psychological dualism enjoys in neo-Kantian moral psychology, specifically in regard to Tamar Schapiro’s account of the nature of inclination. I argue that Kant’s own account of inclination instead provides evidence of his commitment to psychological monism, the idea that the (...) mentality of an adult human being is rational through and through. I first consider Schapiro’s “intuitions” in favour of dualism: inclination must have a non-rational source, she contends, because they assail us unbidden and are not immediately responsive to volition, and because we are not responsible simply for having inclinations (only for acting on them). I explain how a monistic account of the nature of inclination can accommodate the first two points, and explain why the third neither is a point a Kantian can accept, nor is its denial the affront to common sense that Schapiro supposes. Then I turn to Schapiro’s aim to conceive of reflection as non-rational and thus independent of justificatory thought, and yet such as to induce rational reflection. I argue that it remains mysterious how inclination, on her account, could be resourced to play this role; and with that criticism in mind, I conclude by making a positive case for Kant’s conceiving of inclination in monistic terms, as an expression of rational mindedness. (shrink)

What reasons can children have for coming to care about particular things so that they can develop into responsible adults? This question raises issues both about the status of such reasons as "internal" or "external" to the child’s subjective motivational set and about the role of adults in guiding children’s choices. In confronting this latter question, Tamar Schapiro argues that adults can adopt what amounts to a two-pronged strategy: of rewarding or punishing the child and of offering explanations and (...) justifications. Such a strategy, however, ignores the special role loving caregivers can play in a child’s life. By developing an account of such paternalistically loving relationships, I show how the caregiver’s conception of the child’s well-being can come to inform the child’s own sense of herself and so to provide her with essentially interpersonal reasons for caring. Indeed, such reasons can be both normatively and motivationally binding on the child even though she may not yet be in a position to understand them. That such reasons are essentially interpersonal seems to make otiose whether they are "internal" or "external," thereby rendering that distinction less important than we might have thought. (shrink)

Tamar Schapiro has offered an important new ‘Kantian’ account of inclination and motivation, one that expands and refines Christine Korsgaard’s view. In this article I argue that Kant’s own view differs significantly from Schapiro’s. Above all, Kant thinks of inclinations as dispositions, not occurrent desires; and he does not believe that they stem directly from a non-rational source, as she argues. Schapiro’s ‘Kantian’ view rests on a much sharper distinction between the rational and non-rational parts of the (...) soul. In the process of explaining these differences, I argue that Kant’s own view is in some respects philosophically superior to Schapiro’s. (shrink)

IN THE winter and spring of 1031,1 was invited to give a series of ten lectures at Harvard University. The subject chosen was the Philosophy of Art; the lectures are the origin of the present volume. The Lectureship was founded in memory of William James and I esteem it a great honor to have this book associated even indirectly with his distinguished name. It is a pleasure, also, te recall, in connection with the lectures, the unvarying kindness and hospitality of (...) my colleagues in the department of philosophy at Harvard. I am somewhat embarrassed in an effort to acknowledge indebtedness to other writers on the subject. Some aspects of it may be inferred from authors mentioned or quoted in the text. I have read on the subject for many years, however, more or less widely in English literature, somewhat less in French and still less in German, and I have absorbed much from sources which I cannot now directly recall. Moreover, my obligations to a number of writers are much greater than might be gathered from allusions to them in the volume itself. My indebtedness to those who have helped me directly can be more easily stated. Dr. Joseph Ratner gave me a number of valuable references. Dr. Meyer Schapiro was good enough to read the twelfth and thirteenth chapters and to make suggestions which I have freely adopted. Irwin Edman read a large part of the book in manuscript and I owe much to his suggestions and criticism. Sidney Hook read many of the chapters, and their present form is largely the result of discussions with him; this statement is especially true of the chapters on criticism and the last chapter. My greatest indebtedness is to Dr. A. C. Barnes. The chaptershave been gone over one by one with him, and yet what I owe to his comments and suggestions on this account is but a small measure of my debt. I have had the benefit of con versations with him through a period of years, many of which occurred in the presence of the unrivaled collection of pictures he has assembled. The influence of these conversations, together with that of his books, has been a chief factor in shapingmy own thinking about the philosophy of esthetics. Whatever is sound in this volume is due more than I can say to the great educational work carried on in the Barnes Foundation. That work is of a pioneer quality comparable to the best that has been done in any field during the present generation, that of science not ex cepted. I should be glad to think of this volume as one phase of the widespread influence the Foundation is exercising. I am indebted to the Barnes Foundation for permission to reproduce a number of illustrations and to Barbara and Willard Morgan for the photographs from which the reproductions were made. J. D. (shrink)

In a pair of influential papers, Tamar Schapiro argues that childhood is a ‘predicament’, in that children lack stable characters that allow them to be subjects of ascriptions of moral responsibility. Comparing childhood to the political ‘state of nature’, Schapiro holds that childhood is a stage of life from which agents must be liberated. I argue that the comparison to the state of nature gives rise to the implication that ‘instantaneous adulthood’ would be a desirable state. Canvassing the (...) nascent literature on ‘intrinsic goods of childhood’, I hold that such views cannot defeat Schapiro's implications, as they are based on theories of value that beg the question against Schapiro's. Only if childhood can be shown to be a necessary stage toward a normatively attractive adulthood can the ‘instantaneous adulthood’ implication be defeated. I show that Schapiro's view is only plausible if it incorporates the endorsement condition and the articulacy condition. But these are incompatible with instantaneous adulthood. Childhood can be seen as the stage in life in which agents actively endorse their characters, and gain articulacy with respect to the maxims that constitute them. (shrink)

In this paper I untangle a recent debate in the philosophy of epidemiology, focusing in particular on the Potential Outcomes Approach to causation. As the POA strategy includes the quantification of ‘contrary-to-fact’ outcomes, it is unsurprising that it has been likened to the counterfactual analysis of causation briefly proposed by David Hume, and later developed by David Lewis. However, I contend that this has led to much confusion. Miguel Hernan and Sarah Taubman have recently argued that meaningful causal inferences cannot (...) be drawn from obesity. This paper prompted Alex Broadbent to criticise the POA conception of causation, accusing two of the four theses its proponents are committed to, of circularity and falsity. Here I scrutinise Broadbent’s claims, and suggest that a Popperian approach to causal inference in epidemiology diffuses both of his objections. However, I move on to argue that the POA’s commitment to granting only manipulable conditions causal-status, renders the position implausible as a conceptual analysis of causation. That said, I conclude that the strategy the POA employs is an effective tool for effect-measurement in intervention-cases; if it is a conceptual analysis of causation at all, it must be restricted to the causal analysis of manipulable conditions. The POA’s failure to successfully demarcate causal from non-causal conditions simpliciter should therefore not be viewed as a serious threat. (shrink)

Kant's Incorporation Thesis states that inclinations do not determine the will independently of reason. But do inclinations represent objects as desirable independently of reason? Or, is reason involved in the very constitution of an inclination so that inclinations without reason are impossible? The former interpretation is held by Christine Korsgaard and Tamar Schapiro. The latter is given by Janelle DeWitt and Allen Wood. I argue for a novel version of the latter interpretation by appealing to Kant's hylomorphism. On my (...) interpretation, reason makes inclinations possible in the way that form does matter. Reason orders the objects of our possible inclinations amongst all our ends in a system. Rather than these relations being consequent to or dependent upon the contents of our inclinations, I argue that these relations are a priori conditions of the possibility of our inclinations. For, we come to have particular inclinations only by their objects coming to occupy places in our system of ends, where such places are antecedently marked out by reason's determination of the interrelations among all our ends. (shrink)

Critics often charge that Kantian ethics is implausibly rigoristic: that Kantianism recognizes a set of perfect duties, encapsulated in rules such as ‘don’t lie,’ ‘keep one’s promises,’ etc., and that these rules apply without exception. Though a number of Kantians have plausibly argued that Kantianism can acknowledge exceptions to perfect duties, this acknowledgment alone does not indicate how and when such exceptions ought to be made. This article critiques a recent attempt to motivate how such exceptions are to be made, (...) namely, the constitutive approach developed by Tamar Schapiro. I argue that the constitutive approach is vulnerable to the objection that it is too permissive, justifying many morally dubious exceptions to perfect duties. I conclude by briefly outlining an alternative ‘fine print’ approach to the rigorism objection that appears to avoid the objection leveled at Schapiro’s approach, focusing on how modifying the constituents of agents’ maxims can change the deontic status of an act of a generally impermissible kind. (shrink)

In “Compliance, Complicity, and the Nature of Nonideal Conditions” (2003), Tamar Schapiro suggests a framework that deontological theories might use to mitigate the stringency of the moral law in certain cases. This framework depends on a crucial distinction between two forms of non-compliance: transgression and subversion. Schapiro considers several possibilities for cases of subversive non-compliance including an intriguing fictional example from L.A. Confidential2003, p. 347) and Kant’s infamous murder at the door scenario (2006, p. 52). For the purpose (...) of this essay, I will focus on Schapiro’s analysis of the murderer at the door scenario. While her analysis is nuanced and insightful, I contend that Schapiro has mistaken the nature of the murderer’s non-compliance in this case. I highlight this by developing the game analogy further. I suggest that the murderer is not refusing to play, as Schapiro would have it, rather he is cleverly playing the game by exploiting its rules. Seen in this light, his wrongdoing in this scenario would not be enough to subvert, or corrupt, the entire practice. Given this, disobedience to the moral law (lying in this case) would not be justified. I go on to suggest that further development of the game analogy could provide potential new insights into the nature of non-compliance and non-ideal conditions. (shrink)

This paper interprets facts about actions and responsibility in terms of Kant’s category of the ‘intelligible,’ but is also broadly naturalistic in its approach. It analyses intelligible facts in terms of two elements, the institutional and the normative. First, I draw on John Searle’s account of institutional facts. Searle emphasises that neither the meaning of a word nor my possession of something is a matter of empirical facts concerning the entity itself. Instead, to understand the nature of such facts, we (...) must take account of people’s shared beliefs. Kant’s account of property relations can, in part, be understood as an institution in Searle’s sense. Drawing on the work of Tamar Schapiro and Arthur Ripstein, I extend this idea to illuminate our ‘ownership’ of our deeds. Second, and more briefly, I present a normative element. Institutional facts need not, in themselves, be morally compelling. Under conditions of relative freedom and equality, however, I argue that practices of responsibility can be seen as a practical manifestation of critique. This generates a critical self-reflexivity that, I suggest, provides normative warrant to the practices of action and responsibility that we institute among ourselves. (shrink)

This article sketches a strategy for teaching Heidegger’s essay “The Origin of the Work of Art” (“Origin”). I illustrate how one can address Heidegger’s Nazi affiliation while simultaneously engaging his philosophy of art on its own terms—goals that often work at cross purposes in the classroom. Like many, I read “Origin” together with Meyer Schapiro’s critique of Heidegger’s interpretation of a van Gogh still life of shoes, which figures so prominently in “Origin.” My innovation is to pair the Heidegger/ (...) class='Hi'>Schapiro dispute with Holocaust imagery of victims’ shoes and personal effects. Such imagery serves to introduce historical and political context for the debate and to highlight methodological differences in their conceptions of the meaning, reception, and interpretation of artworks and images more generally. These differences raise big-picture questions about the norms that govern our engagements with art and the theoretical desiderata we want a philosophy of art to satisfy. The dispute between Heidegger and Schapiro, read in conjunction with Holocaust imagery, lends these rather abstract questions a concreteness and urgency that greatly enhances classroom discussion. (shrink)

The association between New York City’s all-over structure and the play that unfolds within it relative to difference and identity is very pertinent but is not specific enough, in my opinion. On the one hand, all of Mondrian’s neoplastic works are constituted by an opposition between the variable and the invariable . On the other hand, the type of identity produced in New York City relies on repetition, a principle which, we know, explicitly governs a whole range of paintings predating (...) neoplasticism. New York City differs from the “classic” neoplastic works, as well as from the 1918-19 modular paintings with which it seems to have a good deal in common. It is, in part, because he never discusses this last point that Masheck doesn’t entirely grasp the amplitude of the reversal that Mondrian effected in his New York works.In fact, as James Johnson Sweeney realized quite early, one must go back o the 1917 works, which gave rise to modular grids for the two years that followed, in order to understand what happens not only in New York City but also in the two Boogie-Woogie paintings.3Everyone is aware of the extraordinarily rapid evolution of Mondrian’s work during the years immediately preceding the foundation of neoplasticism: under the influence of Bart van der Leck, he dopted the colored plane and the black dash on a white background as elements of his composition for the two Compositions in Color, A and B . Mondrian, who had not yet found a means of perspicuously relating these diverse elements , tied both plane and dashes together by way of an optical dynamism, based largely on their superimposition. The immediate consequence was to make the background recede optically. The next step was the five Compositions , all entitled “With Colored Planes” . Here all superimposition was eliminated, as well as all “line.” In the last two of these canvases, the background itself is divided without remainder in to planes of different shades of white. The colored rectangles are on the way to alignment. In spite of this, the rectangles fluctuate and, consequently, the background is hollowed out behind them. 3. See James Johnson Sweeney, “Mondrian, the Dutch and De Stijl,” Art News 50 : 63. Meyer Schapiro made a similar remark, at about the same time, in his courses. 4. When I refer to a number accompanied by “Seuphor,” it refers to the “catalog by group” included in Michel Seuphor’s book on the artist. See Seuphor [Ferdinand Louis Berckelaers], Piet Mondrian; sa vie, son oeuvre, 2d ed. . Yve-Alain Bois is associate professor of art history at the Johns Hopkins University. He has published a number of essays on twentieth-century art, architecture, and criticism and is currently working on Mondrian’s neoplastic years and on a history of axonometric perspective. Amy Reiter-McIntosh is a lecturer at the University of Chicago. Her previous contribution to Critical Inquiry was a translation of Ernesto Laclau’s “Psychanalyse et marxisme”. (shrink)

When the Spaniards arrived in Mexico they were astonished and stupiti ed by the strangeness of this new world, in which beauty and horror merged. It was not by accident that Hernán Cortés spoke of “its grandeur, the strange and marvelous things of this land,” and resigned himself to the impossibility of adequately describing these things: “Even badly expressed, I know very well that they will be so amazing that they will not be believed, because even those of us (...) who have seen these things with our own eyes are unable to comprehend them.” Travelling the land, Bernal Díaz del Castillo was overwhelmed as he beheld an “enchanted” land that reminded him of Amadis de Gaul. “Some of us asked ourselves whether what we were seeing was a dream.” Everything was strange and “never seen before.” Both men praised the great cities, such as Tlaxcala, “so grand and deserving of such admiration that even though much of what I could say about it must be left unsaid, what little I will say is almost incredible …”; or Tenochtitlán, “the most beautiful thing in the world,” with its structures and gardens “so marvelous, that it seemed to me almost impossible to describe their perfection and grandeur.” The native works of gold and silver, and of stone and feathers, seemed so extraordinary to the Spaniards “that it is simply impossible to understand how these objects, and with what instruments, were made so perfect.” Cortés as much as Bernal Díaz praised the capabilities of the Indians; their wisdom in peace, their courage in war. But most amazing of all was their religion. Its external aspects provoked horror and repugnance: the menacing ugliness of their “idols,” their bloody sacrifices, and the anthropophagy - according to the Spaniards, one could imagine nothing more “horrible and abominable.” Despite all this, the Spaniards could not help but marvel at their religious zeal, their devotion and diligence: “If they truly serve God with such faith, fervor, and diligence, they must be able to work many miracles.” Emerging from the ocean like a mirage or a dream, the new world was at once incomprehensible and fascinating, refined and abominable, beautiful and terrible. To the eyes of Western man, it was foreign, strangeness itself, the quintessential “other.”. (shrink)